In spite of the proliferation of research and Government Reports on floods in the UK, there are about 5 million properties located in flood prone areas. Many of the houses have been built during the past 50 years with little regard to the existing and future flood risk. Decision makers, who are part of the Establishment, rely on the outputs of models which are produced by so called "experts". But this information has been found to be flawed. However, the Establishment is largely unwilling to allow local knowledge when assessing flood risk, even though prevailing methodology suggests otherwise. This situation has grown worse since the formation of the Environment Agency in 1996. The public engagement with flood risk science and its application needs to proceed along a co-production of knowledge model. Three examples of the difficulties of making realistic assessments of fluvial flood risk are described. The problem of surface water flooding is also considered since it too has local causes which may not be accounted for in standard methodology. Finally, more open discussion and co-operation in identifying flood problems in the UK is called for.
Introduction
In prehistoric times the UK was populated by hilltop tribes. These were later displaced by the Saxon invaders who colonised the river valleys and gave rise to many towns and villages that exist today [1] . They were situated in a flood free position and the present day stone built churches, which may have replaced an earlier wooden place of worship, are well above the occasional flood level. After st century this situation has changed due to higher living standards and a more prosperous economy. Providing solutions to flooding problems has been a long and slow process. Since rivers existed before people arrived almost all the problems are man made: our prehistoric forefathers occupied flood free sites.
The Saxon settlers chose sites high enough not to be washed away and low enough to be warm and avoid wind damage. Now, the seemingly intractable problem of flood alleviation is much more complicated. The following eight extracts introduce some of the issues. In this paper they are discussed in the context of the interaction of the public with the decision making Authorities. Three examples which exemplify the issues are then described.
Walter Kollmorgen: Settlement control beats flood control [2] "A friend of mine remarked that before the flood he valued his land at $300 per acre, but after the flood he valued it at $400 per acre because fill of proper textured material had solved all drainage problems and removed all waste land.
Flooded floodplains are in no way to be compared to an enemy, although our attack on flood problems suggests the lavish expenditures of money and resources thrown into a military campaign. Geographic engineering directed at settlement control can resolve many of the flood-loss problems".
Smith and Tobin: Human adjustment to the Flood Hazard. [3] "As a result of inadequate planning policies and partial alleviation strategies, the responsible authorities have failed to contain the flood hazard. In essence, flood losses continue to rise because, in an increasingly crowded world, man has put a progressively higher premium on a floodplain location and the attendant risks of such development have been disregarded… Having failed to control floodplain settlement, the authorities have sought to control the rivers. Typically, this form of adjustment has relied on a structural approach with limited engineering work invariably undertaken after a flood event in response to pressure from floodplain dwellers… More recently, the authoritarian adjustment in many areas has included… flood forecasting and warning systems… Unfortunately, the mistakes associated with the structural adjustments have been repeated in that these schemes have been installed with comparatively little regard for social feasibility". Paul Samuels: [5] .
"Absolute protection from flooding cannot be achieved and the societal goal is for the management of flood risks at an "acceptable" level. Flood risk management therefore has the character of a "wicked problem" [6] in that flood risk is part of a broader environmental and social system, there are many potential solutions with no "true" or "false" answers and different stakeholders have differing (and potentially conflicting) views of the problem".
Interview with a Councillor at Pickering, Yorkshire UK [7] .
"the hydrologists, the scientists are all going a very straight, linear route that is almost like purely theoretical. That would be ok if they were 100% right. Now they may be significantly correct, in terms of the proportions of what works, and what doesn't work, in terms of flood management. But I still feel even though I understand where they are coming from… there is a lot of historical evidence that they have just completely discounted in a very offhand way. And that there is a kind of myopia there that is again born of confidence, but confidence is moving into arrogance."
Interview with a second Councillor at Pickering [7] .
"Don't trust the Environment Agency…if they get their experts on it, they will pay them a fortune, and they will come up with a massive system. The Environment Agency cannot be trusted."
National Flood Resilience Review [8] .
"This is the first time that fluvial flood risk has been based on realistic rainfall scenarios and considered extreme events that are meteorologically plausible but lie outside existing observational records. Previous assessments have used peak river flows based on historical records. This means that this study is breaking new ground on how flood risk is assessed; however it is important to be clear The historical knowledge that seems to be missing in the opinion of the Councillor at Pickering is the very information that is described in both the Flood Studies Report [13] and more explicitly in the Flood Estimation Handbook [14] . In the HMG [8] review of floods the value of historical flood information is stressed. Such information has been used in the design of flood schemes for over 50 years [15] .
The National Flood Resilience Review shows that their knowledge is far from complete. The use of rainfall estimates [8] which fall outside the measured values was described for the river Brue by Clark [16] and for the Kenwyn at Truro [17] .
More alarming is that nearly all of the houses built in 2014-2015 in flood prone areas were approved by the Environment Agency, showing a lack of knowledge to give better advice.
The Report from the DEFRA Select Committee shows a lack of knowledge of what exists to deal with problems of flooding. There is no alternative suggestion to describing the chances of a flood taking place, and while a new Body to oversee flooding was proposed, the additional knowledge that the Body should possess was not specified either implicitly or explicitly.
Understanding
That floods are a problem caused by the ecological imbalance of Man and the environment was well understood by Kollmorgen [2] . Smith and Tobin [3] added their analysis of the situation with the problem of lack of space and by implication wrong choice of sites for building. Samuels [5] misses the point that some flood problems have become worse through the provision of poor road drainage and the significant raising of Highway surfaces: this point is described later in this paper.
The level of understanding of flood wave generation, and translation down the watercourse has eluded the Environment Agency [4] . The use of telemetered rainfall has been in use for decades [18] , and it is significant that some staff of climate change on future flooding will be difficult to prove, especially in view of the recent slow down of global temperature rise [19] . The call for more research when the solution to many flood problems is clear suggests that the study of floods has become a grow industry in itself as described by Whitmarsh [20] . 
Interaction with the Public as an Impediment to Progress
Perhaps it was the ground breaking paper by Callon [21] who highlighted the likely mistrust of the Public of technocrats and the growing divide between specialists and non-specialists. This is inevitable in a rapidly changing technological world, but it can lead to decisions that are later found to be wrong, which leads there is more co-operation between the public and the decision makers which can lead to new information being incorporated into the decision making process. This allows a more open dialogue between the public and knowledge producers such as scientists whose knowledge may not be complete.
As an example of the CKM model in practice, Lane et al. [7] described the evolution of a solution to the flooding problem at Pickerng in Yorkshire UK.
The situation started with great mistrust between local people and the Environment Agency which is contrary to their own guidelines [22] . At Pickering a traditional engineering solution to the floods did not meet economic criteria so the people were left without any significant help. A local flood research group was set up by inviting local people to become involved to try and improve the situation. The upper Pickering Beck had a low gradient which allowed the construction of low semi permeable wooden dams 2 -3 m high across the valley storing big volumes of water. This scheme was adopted.
However, there is a wide variety of practice across the UK. This may be because of the attitudes of those concerned more than the decision making bodies themselves. The remainder of this paper will describe the nature of models, and the variability of response at three locations in southern England.
The Nature of Hydrological Models
A model can be described as a formal description of an opinion of how a system works. In the case of river floods in the UK this has been dominated by the Flood Studies Report [13] , and the Flood Estimation Handbook [14] . It is worthwhile to note part of the disclaimer at the start of each of five volumes of the latter: "Neither the named authors not the Institute of Hydrology nor its parent bodies have approved any instruction that use of Flood Estimation
Handbook procedures be made mandatory for particular application". Furthermore there are nearly six pages which describe the use of historical flood estimates, commenting that "Greater respect for historical flood data is recommended when they suggest that the preferred frequency curve may be too low".
In addition a method of estimating bankfull discharge based on Wharton et al. [23] is described as a way of making an estimate of the 2-year flood, although many studies give a value of about 1.5 years for this parameter [24] .
The problem with models is that their greatest asset is also their greatest weakness. They are easy to apply, the input data can be obtained from maps or from the FEH CDROM of catchment descriptors, and there is no need for time consuming fieldwork. Computer graphics make the results look even more convincing. Several different models can produce a range of answers. They are the consultant's paradise. There are assumptions regarding extreme value theory, multicollinearity, cumulative errors due to parameter specification, and the ever increasing mistake of simply believing the machine rather than the patient! Like any set of results or hypothesis, they are only scientific if they can be falsified [25] . The results of a flood frequency analysis should be tested with independent observations. If not then we are left with an unscientific theory. Buyer beware!
The Upper Brue, Somerset UK
The author's involvement with the river Brue goes back nearly 60 years. Two letters about the floods at Bruton published in the Western Gazette resulted in a letter from the Wessex Water Authority in 1978 asking for details of the studies made which focused on the flood history of the area. This resulted in a report [26] . What follows is a summary of events during the following 38 years.
1) May 1979 Bruton badly flooded.
2) September 1979. Meeting with WWA to discuss estimates of the peak flow of flood in May.
3) October 1979. WWA revised estimate of peak discharge. 11) Publication of rainfall frequency analysis of 44 sites in SW England [29] which suggested that FSR [13] rainfall estimates were too low.
12) 1995 Publication of new estimates of probable maximum precipitation [30] which showed that 24 hour PMP should be about 500 mm instead of 300 mm. In conclusion the use of models was shown to be seriously flawed. Thankfully, with the supporting evidence of the historic floods, evidence from the Martinstown storm [34] , and the soil survey data [16] , a dam safe from being breached by extreme floods has been produced.
The Valency at Boscastle in Cornwall
The 8) The growth rate of floods in EX5160 [35] is far greater than any river in the whole of SW England.
9) The expected 1 in 1000 year flood in EX5160 is about 300 cumecs while the 1 in 5000 year flood is about 1000 cumecs. This has a rate of runoff of 50 cumecs per km 2 which is 2.5 times greater than the Extreme catastrophic flood of Allard, Table 1 shows the results of both studies.
It is clear that the Environment Agency has adopted the PEM of Callon [21] .
In spite of serious and significant errors and omissions being pointed out, the report of May 2005 remained unchanged. As a result Boscastle has a flood alleviation scheme whose design standard will probably be exceeded in the next 30 years. What is even more alarming is that an alternative scheme to protect the area from fluvial flooding and costing about half of the cost of the channel improvements was not investigated thoroughly. Clearly the PKM was not considered by the Environment Agency.
The situation is made even worse since the Agency declined to use the author's flood warning flow model [11] which would have given at least one hour's warning for the 2004 flood.
The Upper Stour at Bourton, Dorset
The In 2013 another application was made to build a lower number of houses with the addition of light industrial units, a Village Hall, and two low cost houses for [38] who used the models as described in the Flood Estimation Handbook [14] . This approach is for use when there are no riverflow data. However, the FEH does advocate the use of historical flood information. This can include photographs, eye witness accounts, newspaper reports and other archival material. There is a small but growing body of literature which suggests that when historic flood information is used, the estimated discharges are often higher than those predicted by using models. The disadvantage of using more direct hydrological analysis is that searching out and the interpretation of historic flood information can take considerable time, especially in the case of small rivers which tend not to have towns with good news coverage, or many people who have old photographs of floods that they and others have seen.
The response of both Planning Authority and the Environment Agency can be placed in the PEM. There was no opportunity to meet and discuss with the Developer's Consulting Engineer [39] and JBA, [40] , who were asked to review the hydraulic modelling and dam break scenarios, but they failed to consider the reliability of the flood hydrology. The central problem was that the models had so much in common that they could not really represent independent assessments. was extended to include 247 years' events, [41] , which is the second longest record of a small catchment in the whole UK. In spite of this analysis, shown in Figure 1 , the Environment Agency has allowed the development to proceed.
In mid 2016 after more questions were raised about the size of a downstream road bridge, it was admitted that the consultants had used the wrong sized section. Even a site visit by JBA, independent assessors in August 2011 [40] failed to check this important control of upstream water levels at Bourton Mill. Further questioning has shown that the use of bankfull discharge as a measure of the 1.1 -2.0 year flood has been misunderstood by the Agency. Since bankfull discharge has been measured in the field [41] it is now certain that the Consultant's report is in serious error. This also means that the growth factor Q100/Q2 is much greater than their report suggests. It is well known that the model formulations of the FEH often overestimate the 2-year flood. This is because of the big scatter in the HOST [42] indices and standard percentage runoff, and the use of model I regression rather than model II which gives higher HOST percentage runoff rates at low values of observed percentage runoff, and vice versa.
Surface Water or Pluvial Flooding
The occurrence of flooding from sources other than rivers has been well known for decades [43] : the problem is growing [44] . 
Discussion
There has been a tendency for the use of models as opposed to local data to assess flood frequency. In the case of the upper Brue it was the Wessex Water Authority that asked the author for information about historic floods. This led to more research and collaboration with WWA and also enabled the flood detention dam to be built [50] . By the time more recent research showed that the dam was in fact underdesigned and unsafe the organisation of the Water Industry had changed. Staff at Exeter and Bridgwater were unwilling to engage in any informal debate. The exception was in the production of the real time flood warning system. The lack of a PDM or the CKM are both apparent at both Boscastle and Bourton Mill. In the future there will be even more pressure on building land, some of which may be at risk of serious flooding. Past experience of floods has not influenced National Policy anything like the extent that is needed in order to prevent widespread damage to property and death from drowning. While an allowance for climate change has been included in flood risk assessments, there is not enough knowledge about the natural variability of the system to make such allowances effective. When a flood scheme with a design standard of 1 in 100 is badly exceeded during a flood, will the confidence in other schemes be undermined? Models can also give a false sense of the accuracy of the results. Talking about the uncertainty of any result does not appear to change the final design. For example, at Bourton the consultants took the highest of several flood estimates, but at the same time ignored actual events for which evidence exists. Another problem with models is that they do not encourage the user to test the resulting hypotheses. For example, at Boscastle the results in EX5160 [35] could not match the observed frequency of flooding over a hundred year period. The FEH methods are based on riverflow records which are often much shorter than 50 years, while the rainfall estimates used in the FEH do not use data gathered before 1960. How this narrow data set can produce sensible estimates of rare flood events whose rarity is often in excess of 100 years is difficult to imagine.
Flood hydrology is essentially a field based science. Considerable fieldwork is needed to assess and produce solutions to surface water flooding that are caused by raised road levels. The answers to the questions that are badly needed will eventually be found in the field and not at the keyboard of the latest personal computer. The CKM needs to be fully embraced by all branches of the Establishment.
